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Abstract 
Cloud computing provides an effective business model for the deployment of IT infrastructure, 
platform, and software services. Often, facilities are outsourced to cloud providers and this offers the 
service consumer virtualization technologies without the added cost burden of development. However, 
virtualization introduces serious threats to service delivery such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, 
Cross-VM Cache Side Channel attacks, Hypervisor Escape and Hyper-jacking. One of the most 
sophisticated forms of attack is the cross-VM cache side channel attack that exploits shared cache 
memory between VMs. A cache side channel attack results in side channel data leakage, such as 
cryptographic keys. Various techniques used by the attackers to launch cache side channel attack are 
presented, as is a critical analysis of countermeasures against cache side channel attacks. 
Keywords Cloud Computing, Virtualization, Security, Cross-VM Cache Side Channels 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we address specific concerns for the management of secure computing in a Cloud 
Computing (CC) environment. The paper presents the results of a systematic review of factors relating 
to cross-VM cache side channel attacks and countermeasures to prevent attacks or mitigate successful 
intrusions. 
CC is marketed as Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Software-as-a-
Service (SaaS) to customers (Modi et al. 2013; Hashizume et al. 2013; Chhabra and Dixit 2015; You et 
al. 2012; Srinivasan et al. 2012; Ayala et al. 2013). It offers individuals and organizations the use of 
outsourced services through the Internet and typically through a pay-per-use model, as opposed to 
buying and setting up resources in-house (Khorshed et al 2012; Modi et al. 2013; Chhabra and Dixit 
2015; Srinivasan et al. 2012; Vaquero et al. 2011). 
Besides providing a cost effective solution, the CC environment also gives benefits such as elasticity 
(Khorshed et al 2012; You et al. 2012; Srinivasan et al. 2012; Ayala et al. 2013; Tianfield 2012), 
scalability (Hashizume et al. 2013; Chhabra and Dixit 2015; Vaquero et al. 2011) and multi-tenancy 
(Hashizume et al. 2013; Chhabra and Dixit 2015; Tianfield 2012). 
Virtualization is core to CC (Shoaib and Das 2014) and helps Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) create a 
multi-tenanted architecture. Virtualization is the simulation of hardware and/or software upon which 
different other software and applications can run. Virtualization allows the sharing of hardware 
resources between different tenants by creating Virtual Machines (VM) (Chhabra and Dixit 2015) that 
emulate the physical server system. For example, by using virtualization in IaaS, customers can create, 
share, copy and migrate VMs (Hashizume et al. 2013) and install different operating systems, and 
install and run software according to their unique requirements (Chhabra and Dixit 2015). The 
virtualization management system, Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) ensures that the VMs running on 
the shared hardware are isolated from each other as separate entities (You et al. 2012). 
A VMM or hypervisor is the software layer between hardware and the host operating system of the 
hardware server (You et al. 2012). The VMM sets the platform for virtualization by allowing the 
creation and management of different VMs on a server. The hypervisor controls the flow of 
instructions between the guest VM operating system and the physical hardware (Ayala et al. 2013), 
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involving elements such as CPU core, cache memory, main memory, hard drives and network interface 
cards. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Threats and Vulnerabilities to CC 
Hypervisors have two broad categories: a) Native or bare-metal virtualization hypervisors, such as 
XenServer, Microsoft Hyper-V and VMware ESX/EXSi; b) Hosted virtualization hypervisor, for 
example VMware Workstation/Player, Kernel-based VM (KVM), Microsoft Virtual PC and Oracle 
VirtualBox (Pek et al. 2013). However, a detailed analysis by Diego et al. (2013) shows that 
vulnerabilities exist in the popular open source XEN and KVM hypervisors. These have been reported 
in vulnerability databases; National Vulnerability Database (NVD), Red Hat Bugzilla, Security Focus 
and CSV Details. The vulnerabilities present in these hypervisors are characterized and furthermore, 
the categories of vulnerabilities are integrated to identify attack paths. This provides the opportunity 
for countermeasures to be developed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A discussion about known threats and vulnerabilities in 
each cloud service model is presented in section 2. Section 3 explains the cross-VM side-channel 
attack. In section 4, cache side channel attack is explained along with, its different types and the 
techniques used to launch these attacks. We discuss cache side-channel attacks in the virtualized 
environment in section 5. Section 6 presents the results of an analysis of existing countermeasures 
proposed to defend against these attacks. 
2 Threats and Vulnerabilities in Cloud Computing 
In this section, we discuss threats and vulnerabilities in CC, some common threats and vulnerabilities 
are highlighted in detail, and account and service hijacking. 
Vulnerability refers to a weakness or flaw in a system that can be exploited by an event called an 
attack (Hashizume et al. 2013; Tianfield 2012). A threat (see Figure 1) is an exploitation of any known 
vulnerability that can result in serious loss of data and information (Modi et al. 2013). These threats 
and vulnerabilities are perceived as a barrier for organizations wishing to adopt cloud services 
(Hashizume et al. 2013). The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has highlighted top threats to CC (Alva et 
al. 2013). 
Data Breaches and Loss are very severe threats because of cloud services’ shared architecture. Data 
loss can occur if data are being deleted without having backup or if there is any disaster and no proper 
mechanisms are adopted to recover it (Khorshed et al 2012).  
Confidentiality, integrity and availability of customer’s data are put at risk (Alva et al. 2013) when an 
attacker has a chance to hijack a user’s account details by stealing user credentials and information. An 
attacker may use various methods such as phishing, DoS and Man-in-the-Middle attack to steal user 
credentials (Khorshed et al. 2012) and then use them to eavesdrop on a user’s activities and 
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transactions. More sophisticated attacks involve combinations of these methods for pecuniary gain. 
Some methods for which successful attacks may be achieved include: 
 Insecure Application Programing Interfaces (APIs): A CSP offers infrastructure, software and 
platform services to customers and gives them access to services through Application Programing 
Interfaces (APIs) (Khorshed et al 2012; Chhabra and Dixit 2015; Ayala et al. 2013). Users manage 
services they consume by using these APIs (Modi et al. 2013), for example, PaaS APIs provide 
access and functionality for cloud, SaaS APIs provide connectivity to applications, IaaS APIs 
provides control and distribution over specific cloud resources. 
 Confidentiality, integrity and authentication of a cloud service are very much dependent on how 
APIs are designed and developed (Hashizume et al. 2013; Vaquero et al. 2011; Ayala et al. 2013). 
Thus, it is the responsibility of the designer and developer to make it difficult for malicious users 
to exploit potential vulnerabilities. For example, design flaws of the APIs to the underlying SSL 
libraries (Georgiev et al. 2012) provide leverage for a user with malicious intent to execute harmful 
actions (Srinivasan et al. 2012). 
 Malicious Insider: Confidentiality, integrity and availability may be violated if customer data 
abuse occurs from someone with authorized access but with malicious intent (Alva et al. 2013). 
The malicious insider threat may become apparent because of a lack of transparency in CSP 
processes and procedures and the level of access each employee has to customer data (Modi et al. 
2013; Srinivasan et al. 2012).  
 Abuse of Cloud Resources: CSPs give free trials of IaaS to customers in order to convince them to 
purchase this service later on. However, due to a lack of control exercised by the CSP, customers 
may take the opportunity to perform malicious activities using the powerful hardware platform 
provided by the CSP (Khorshed et al. 2012; Modi et al. 2013). Furthermore, such hardware gives 
them chance to crack encryption keys (Modi et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2013). 
 Shared Technology Vulnerabilities: Virtualization provides multi-tenancy through the sharing of 
hardware resources like CPU cores, high level cache, storage devices and network interface cards 
among different tenants (Ayala et al. 2013). The hypervisor provides a platform for virtualization 
and is responsible for isolation between different VMs running on a shared server.  
By exploiting vulnerabilities or configuration flaws, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to a 
hypervisor to control a cloud platform and exploit other customers’ VMs (Khorshed et al. 2012; Modi 
et al. 2013). For example, infrastructure sharing is one core cloud service but because of hardware 
sharing limitations, lacks basic protection mechanisms to protect customer network traffic, data and 
other applications. This provides an attacker a chance to hijack user credentials, eavesdrop on 
information and control other users’ VMs (Khorshed et al. 2012). 
Shah and Vania (2014) highlight two common vulnerabilities present in virtualization technology, VM 
hopping (co-resident attack) and VM Migration/Mobility vulnerabilities. The VM live migration 
process exposes guest OS information on the fly. Through VM hopping an attacker can extract 
information from a co-resident VM by exploiting the shared cache memory among different VMs that 
are running co-resident with the attacker’s VM.  
3 Cross-VM Side Channel Attacks 
Cross-VM side channel attacks are identified as a very sophisticated attack in CC. In cases where there 
exist shared hardware resources, the side channel attack exploits information obtained from the usage 
of, for example, Central Processing Unit (CPU) core and high level cache memory as opposed to 
exploiting theoretical weaknesses like the brute force attack (Vaquero et al. 2011). 
In a typical cross-VM side channel attack scenario, an adversary places a malicious VM co-resident to 
the target VM so that they share the same hardware resources (Ristenpart et al. 2009). Then, the 
attacker extracts useful information such as cryptographic keys from the target VM (Zhang et al. 2012) 
to use them for traffic eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Through the side channel attack, 
an attacker sharing the same cache as the victim can monitor the cache access behaviour of the victim. 
For example, the attacker is able to monitor cache timing information by measuring the execution of 
different operations on the victim’s VM (Zhang and Lee 2014). Generally, the attacker exploits timings 
in the shared high-level cache memory. However, power consumption or electromagnetic leaks can 
also be used as a vector to launch side channel attacks (Vaquero et al. 2011).  
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4 Cache-Based Side Channel Attacks 
4.1 Cache Architecture 
The modern x64 microprocessor has multiple levels of cache: Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. In a 
processor with multiple cores and three levels of cache, each processor core has its own separate L1 
and L2 cache while L3 cache is shared among all the cores of the processor (Yarom and Falkner 2013; 
Kim et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2011). Therefore, the shared architecture of L3 cache among different 
cores creates an opportunity for a malicious user to exploit it and launch a side channel attack. 
In a typical scenario, when the processor needs data, it checks L1, L2 and L3 caches respectively. If the 
requested data are present at any level then the data are read and a cache hit occurs. However, if data 
are not available in any cache level, then a cache miss occurs and the processor gets data from RAM 
and places it in the cache ready for the next call. In the event of a cache miss, the processor may also 
take advantage of spatial locality by fetching data from near cache locations, because it is expected that 
data in near cache locations are going to be accessed soon (Irazoqui et al., 2014a; 2014b). Moreover, 
data fetched from RAM and placed in cache are in fixed sized blocks called cache lines, and a cache 
entry is created during this process. 
4.2 Cache Organization 
To gain an understanding of cache organisation and the role of cache-hypervisor relationship, types of 
cache organisation are described. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cache Organisation 
Cache consists of cache pages and cache lines (see Figure 2 on the previous page). The main memory 
(RAM) is divided into a number of cache pages. The size of each cache page depends on the overall size 
of cache. The cache page is further divided into a number of fixed size cache lines. The type of 
processor and the cache design defines the size of each cache line (Intel 2014). 
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4.2.1 Fully Associative 
This scheme allows only lines, not cache pages, to move from main memory to cache. Figure 3 
illustrates that any line from main memory can be located at any location on the cache. 
 
Figure 3: Fully Associative Cache 
4.2.2 Direct-Mapping 
Direct mapping in cache is also called 1-Way set associative cache. In this scheme, the size of each 
main memory page is equal to the size of the cache. Specific lines from main memory move to the same 
line of the cache as shown in Figure 4. For example, the first line of the first main memory page is 
stored in the first cache line. Later, if the second main memory page’s first line needs to be stored in 
the first cache line, then the first page’s line needs to be evicted. 
 
Figure 4: Direct Mapping Cache 
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4.2.3 Set-Associative 
Set-Associative (Figure 5) combines the above schemes and divides the cache into equal sections called 
ways. The size of the cache page is equal to the size of a cache way. This scheme allows 2 or 4 
(typically) lines of main memory pages to be stored on the same cache lines of 2 or 4 cache ways at any 
time. 
 
Figure 5: Set Associative Cache 
Cache is normally configured as a set associative map (Zhang and Reiter 2013). A w-way set 
associative cache is partitioned into m sets and with w lines in each set. Each block of data from RAM 
is placed into one cache set m, but can be placed at any of w lines within the set (Zhang et al. 2011). 
For data that have already been moved to cache, then if data are accessed by a cryptographic algorithm 
such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) from one of the cache lines then the cache will be 
accessed much faster. The algorithm’s data encryption/decryption time depends on the accessed table 
positions and timing information, which can be exploited to gain access to the private keys used 
(Irazoqui et al., 2014a; 2014b). Therefore, cache timing information is important for side channel 
attack. 
4.3 Cache Side Channel Attack Techniques 
Side channel attacks are very sophisticated attacks on cryptographic algorithms like AES, resulting in 
the leakage of encryption keys used by these algorithms. In a side channel attack, an adversary exploits 
the information gained from hardware implementation such as shared cache memory timing, 
electromagnetic radiation or power consumption of the system. 
Over the last few years, cache side channel attacks have been demonstrated using different techniques. 
For cache side channels, there are two types of technique: 
 Prime + Probe Technique: Prime + Probe is a common technique used by an attacker in order to 
learn shared cache behaviour and more specifically, which cache set is accessed by the target. 
Explained in next section, Tromer et al. (2010), Ristenpart et al. (2009), Zhang et al. (2012), and 
Liu et al. (2015) use the Prime + Probe technique to launch access-driven cache side channel 
attacks. In order to observe cache usage by a victim’s process, the attacker runs a spy process in 
parallel to observe the status. 
 Flush + Reload Technique: In a Flush + Reload cache side channel attack, an attacker runs a spy 
process that monitors shared memory pages accessed by the victim’s process. Using a spy process, 
the attacker can monitor the memory lines that a victim’s process has evicted from the cache. By 
monitoring processes, the attacker is able to determine which memory lines the victim accessed. 
From this information, the attacker can extract information from the data processed by the victim. 
Yarom and Falkner (2013), Yarom and Benger (2014), and Irazoqui (2014b) use the Flush + 
Reload technique to demonstrate a cache side channel attack in a virtualized environment. 
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4.4 Types of Cache Side Channel Attacks 
Cache based side channel attacks have three types: time-driven, access-driven and trace-driven. In all 
the cases, the attacker uses the shared cache to monitor the activities of another VM in a hypervisor. 
The types are differentiated by the means by which monitoring occurs. 
4.4.1 Time-driven 
In this type of cache side channel attack, an attacker exploits the correlation between the cryptographic 
operation and cache misses of a victim (Kong et al. 2009). That is, an adversary measures the time a 
victim’s process takes to complete a whole operation such as the time it takes to undertake a 
cryptographic process while memory is being accessed. This is achievable because the amount of time 
it takes for memory to be accessed is dependent upon the state of the cache. The attacker compares the 
different execution times of processes against inputs and looks for specific patterns. The difference in 
timings can be used as leverage to extract information about encryption keys. 
4.4.2 Access-driven 
This attack provides an adversary with a platform to execute a malicious process in parallel with the 
victim’s cryptographic process to derive an insight into the victim’s cache behaviour (Kong et al. 
2009). The attacker learns what cache sets have been accessed by the victim’s cryptographic operation 
by evicting the victim’s cache memory pages. This forces the victim to have a cache miss and then the 
attacker may observe cache miss behaviour with the knowledge that the operation being performed is 
that instigated by the victim. 
4.4.3 Trace-driven 
In this cache side channel attack an attacker monitors the cache lines accessed in a cache set by the 
victim and obtains a profile of cache activity during an encryption process. This sets the platform for 
an attacker to measure memory lines accessed by the cryptographic operation and that resulted in a 
cache hit. Zhao and Wang (2010) present a trace-driven attack on AES by monitoring cache miss 
information and S-box misalignment; around 200 samples of cache miss trace information were 
enough to extract a complete 128-bit AES within seconds. 
5 Cache Side Channel Attacks in the Virtualized Environment 
In this section we provide evidence of the effectiveness of side channel attacks through the application 
of a number of techniques. The cache-based side channel attack presents a serious threat to the cloud 
virtual environment. Whereas the client server based network environment makes it difficult to 
undertake this type of attack, it is the shared hardware resources that characterise a typical hypervisor 
environment that permits the cache side channel attack. As described in the previous section, an 
attacker sharing the same cache as a victim can monitor the cache access behaviour of the victim, such 
as cache timing information, by measuring the execution of different operations on the victim’s VM 
(Zhang and Lee 2014). Cache timing information gives an adversary a platform from which to launch a 
side channel attack to break cryptographic algorithms (Godfrey and Zulkernine 2013) and thus to 
extract encryption keys. In the virtual environment, prior to the cross-VM side channel attack, the 
attacker needs to identify the target VM’s location and place a malicious VM co-resident with the 
target. Later, that attacker may use the maliciously placed VM to extract information from the target 
VM with the side channel attack. 
Using Amazon EC2 as case study, Ristenpart et al. (2009) explains that it is possible to map the cloud 
infrastructure to find out that where a particular target VM resides. Two VMs are co-located on the 
shared hardware by exploiting EC2’s placement policy and since the cache is shared, the extraction of 
keystroke timing information using access-driven side channel attack is enabled. 
In a different example in which both access and timing approaches are used, Zhang et al. (2012) 
present an access-driven cross VM side channel attack on a symmetric multiprocessing system and 
extract useful information from a target VM. Through a cache timing attack, they recover an ElGamal 
decryption key from the victim VM using the libgcrypt cryptographic library.  
Yarom and Falkner (2013) present a cross CPU-cores side channel attack by exploiting and monitoring 
memory page sharing between different processes. This attack is based on the new Flush + Reload 
technique that evict a memory line from the cache, allowing the attacker and target system to execute 
at same time. Yarom and Benger (2014) extend this and present a Flush + Reload cache side channel 
attack that exploits an x86 processor architecture as it allows one process to monitor another process’ 
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access to cache memory pages. The attack highlights a serious threat to any cryptographic algorithm 
based on OpenSSL implementation. 
Using Bernstein’s correlation attack as a base for the first time in a virtual environment, Irazoqui et al. 
(2014a) show that cross-VM side channel attacks on VMware, Xen and KVM are possible. Despite 
running on different CPU cores on the same hardware, VMs are vulnerable to side channel attacks 
resulting in the leakage of AES keys by using the timing difference between cache line accesses. Weiss 
et al. (2012) extend the Bernstein correlation attack by demonstrating a time-driven cache attack on an 
embedded ARM based operating system platform, bypassing the isolation characteristics of 
virtualization. 
Irazoqui (2014b) use the Flush + Reload cache side channel attack on VMs running on a VMware 
hypervisor. The attack exploits a memory de-duplication mechanism called transparent page sharing. 
The result is a very fast full recovery of keys from the AES implementation of OpenSSL 1.0.1. 
6 Cache Side Channel Attack Countermeasures 
The shared cache between different cores of modern processors is a concern because it permits side 
channel attacks. Previously, we present an overview of side channel attacks exploiting cache memory. 
The problem in cache design is cache contention, which allows different users’ processes to evict the 
contents of a cache that is used by other users (Jin et al. 2009). In this section and keeping shared 
cache vulnerabilities in mind, to defend against cache side channel attacks, a range of mitigation and 
prevention techniques or countermeasures are presented. 
In Table 1, cache side channel attack countermeasures are critically analysed and present the following 
types of solution: 
 Hardware-based Solutions: Page (2005), Domnitser et al. (2012), and Kong et al. (2013) propose 
new designs for a shared cache wherein cache portions are created and by isolating these portions 
from each other, each CPU core is each assigned a separate portion. 
 Software-based Solutions: Coppens et al. (2009), Jin et al. (2009), Aviram et al. (2010), Shi et al. 
(2011), Zhang & Reiter (2013), and Godfrey and Zulkernine (2013) propose a software based 
solution to protect against side channel attacks in a client-server based network as well as a cloud 
environment. 
 Hypervisor-based Solutions: Raj et al. (2009), Vattikonda et al. (2011), Kim et al. (2012), and Wu 
et al. (2014) propose a solution involving changes at the hypervisor level.  
Table 1. Analysis of Cache Side Channel Attack Countermeasures 
  
 
Paper Title Author Solution Proposed Limitations 
Partitioned Cache 
Architecture as a 
Side-Channel 
Defence 
Mechanism 
Page, D. Cache partition based solution. 
Design makes cache the visible 
part of the architecture and 
divides it into regions. Each 
individual cache region is 
allocated to a separate 
application, reducing the 
chances of interference as 
compared to single shared 
cache 
Solution requires changes to 
underlying hardware design 
that can create significant 
performance degradation. 
Moreover, the solution 
conflicts with the cloud model 
either by restricting hardware 
requirements or customers of 
CSP need to have additional 
skills. 
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Paper Title Author Solution Proposed Limitations 
Non-
monopolizable 
caches: Low-
complexity 
mitigation of 
cache side 
channel attacks 
Domnitser et 
al. 
Cache partitioning technique 
with minor changes in cache 
replacement logic without 
influencing overall cache core 
circuitry. Dynamically reserves 
cache lines for legitimate users 
by restricting an attacker to 
only accessing unreserved 
cache lines 
The solution is only effective 
when the attacker’s malicious 
process is running in parallel 
with a victim’s process. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to 
find any general hardware 
based solutions that are 
adopted in mainstream 
processors as such solutions 
are tested qualitatively. 
Architecting 
against software 
cache-based side-
channel attacks 
Kong et al. Mitigation technique that 
hides or obfuscates cache 
access by different cores 
The solution leads to different 
challenges in design 
modification. Requires code 
changes to make the solution 
understand branch prediction 
analysis based side channel 
attack and to protect the 
information. Moreover, 
modifications to mitigate side 
channel attack can impact the 
performance of the system 
Practical 
mitigations for 
timing-based 
side-channel 
attacks on 
modern x86 
processors 
Coppens et al. Compiler based side channel 
mitigation technique to defend 
against timing side channel 
attacks in non-cloud 
environment. They modify the 
compiler to remove 
dependencies of control flow 
on cryptographic functions, 
such as secret keys 
The hardware solution lacks 
generality and gives poor 
performance. Furthermore 
proposed solution leaves cloud 
applications vulnerable to 
trace-driven attacks 
A simple cache 
partitioning 
approach in a 
virtualized 
environment 
Jin et al. Static page colouring cache 
partitioning technique that is 
implemented in Xen VMM 
environment. The proposed 
approach restricts L2 shared 
cache exploitation and its 
implementation in VMM is 
fully transparent to guest VMs 
The proposed approach 
allocates static cache pages to 
VMs that results in a limited 
number of cache sets available 
for use by VMs requiring 
cache access. This results in 
degradation of system 
performance not only for the 
VMs that have already secured 
a cache portion but also for 
the other VMs that need to 
have cache access 
Table 1: Continued 
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Table 1: Continued 
  
Paper Title Author Solution Proposed Limitations 
Determinating 
timing channels 
in compute clouds 
Aviram et al. A software method to prevent 
timing channel based attack on 
a CSP enforced deterministic 
execution as compared to 
hardware based solution such 
as cache partitioning 
The proposed solution forces 
the VMs execution to be 
deterministic to protect 
against timing channel 
attacks, resulting in many 
applications being left 
vulnerable. Needs fine grain 
timing information for 
execution in cloud 
environment 
 
Limiting cache-
based side-
channel in multi-
tenant cloud 
using dynamic 
page colouring 
Shi et al. Dynamic cache memory page 
colouring technique that 
provides strong cache isolation 
between different processes of 
security critical operations 
From the client end, the 
approach requires 
modification to the 
components of a hypervisor. 
Prohibits the use of some 
features that a VM can have. 
Therefore, such a solution 
limits its adoption in a cloud 
environment 
A server-side 
solution to cache-
based side-
channel attacks in 
the cloud 
Godfrey, M. 
and 
Zulkernine, M. 
A mitigation technique for a 
cloud server by disabling the 
overlapping characteristics of 
cache memory, ensuring 
isolation in the cache portion 
accessed by VMs. Technique 
uses cache flushing between 
prime and trigger functions  
The solution limits the 
utilization of the available 
resources the VMs that results 
in greater costs 
Duppel: 
Retrofitting 
commodity 
operating systems 
to mitigate cache 
side channels in 
the cloud 
Zhang, Y. and 
Reiter, M. K. 
A system called Duppel that 
adds noise to complicate cache 
timing signals. Duppel adds 
noise by cleaning L1 cache 
frequently in parallel with the 
execution of its tenant 
workload, at a speed that it 
adjusts by assuming what 
timings reflect the workload 
execution being monitored by 
another VM 
In a Simultaneous 
Multithreading (SMT) 
architecture, this scheme 
needs the user to identify the 
process that needs to be 
protected, making the solution 
infeasible for protection 
against side channel attacks. 
Furthermore, it decreases 
cache efficiency because of the 
time needed to do the flush 
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Table 1: Continued 
 
7 Implications of the Proposed Solutions 
The shared cache memory partitioning or isolation and assigning of a separate portion of cache 
memory to each VM can reduce or eliminate successful side channel attacks in a virtualized 
environment. Cloud service providers seek fast or instantaneous delivery of services to customers but 
to mitigate the effects of side channel attacks, the proposed solutions of cache partitioning require 
changes and modifications to the underlying hardware design. The result of changes, as they are 
proposed now, is an overall degradation of performance in the virtual environment. Although some 
solutions may apply when hardware manufacturers make design changes. The alternative to making 
changes to the hardware configuration is to provide a new cache partition technique may prove to be 
very effective.  
Paper Title Author Solution Proposed Limitations 
Resource 
management for 
isolation 
enhanced cloud 
services 
Raj et al. The shared cache is partitioned 
into several regions, with 
specific cache lines using page 
colouring. It provides isolation 
between different VMs by 
allowing them to access only 
certain lines by partitioning 
memory pages 
Solution provides static cache 
partitioning for each VM 
separately which increases 
overhead on the system when 
CSP wants to run more VMs 
on the same physical machine 
Eliminating fine 
grained timers in 
Xen 
Vattikonda et 
al. 
A mitigation approach by 
modifying RDTSC instruction 
on Xen based VMs. It reduces 
the VMs’ access to cache 
timing information by 
providing a fuzzy timer instead 
of fine-grained timers. 
The proposed solution 
protects against timing 
channel attacks. However, it is 
not feasible for applications 
running in the cloud that need 
fine-grained timing 
information 
STEALTHMEM: 
System-Level 
Protection 
Against Cache-
Based Side 
Channel Attacks 
in the Cloud 
Kim et al. A dynamically last level cache 
partitioning mechanism that 
protects the cache by locking 
cache lines per processor core. 
VMs running on each core 
loads data into these locked 
cache lines called stealth 
pages, which cannot be evicted 
by another VM 
The solution partitions the 
cache and assigns a separate 
portion of cache to each VM. 
However, it needs user 
interaction for client side 
modification if some 
applications need access to 
hidden pages of cache 
memory. Therefore, the 
solution is not appropriate for 
the cloud 
C2detector: a 
covert channel 
detection 
framework in CC 
Wu et al. Presented as a framework by 
making small modifications to 
a cloud system. It uses a captor 
located in the Xen hypervisor 
and a synthesis analyser 
implemented as Markov and 
Bayesian for detection of three 
types of covert channels 
between VMs running on same 
hardware server 
The proposed solution 
requires additional hardware 
resources because of its 
complex design. It is used for 
policing purposes 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Shahzad & Litchfield 
2015, Adelaide, South Australia  Cross-VM Side Channel Attacks 
  12 
8 Conclusion 
Acquired from CSPs, virtualization is the core component of CC that provides isolation between the 
different hardware and software services of customers. However along with its benefits, virtualization 
has vulnerabilities. A common vulnerability in the virtualization environment is the share cache 
memory that permits exploitation through a Cross-VM cache based side channel attack, resulting in 
the leakage of AES cryptographic keys. In this paper, we present an overview of the potential for the 
launching of a side channel attack in a virtual environment. We also present the results of a critical 
analysis of solutions proposed by authors. From this analysis, we fail to see that there is an effective 
countermeasure to the Cross-VM cache-based side channel attack despite that there is demand for a 
strong defence mechanism by cloud services consumers. 
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